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REVIVING LENITY AND HONEST BELIEF
AT THE BOUNDARIES OF CRIMINAL LAW
John L. Diamond*
It is a common misconception that there is a line between criminal and innocent conduct
that is transparent and fixed. In fact, much of criminal law is fluid and elastic, free, if stra-
tegically applied, to label conduct as legal or illegal. In some cases, this reflects crimes that
are vaguely defined or imprecise. In other cases, the prohibited conduct simply includes what
is so conventionally accepted as legal that the criminal label is perceived as inapplicable un-
til a prosecutor chooses to apply it. The problem of a fluid rather than a fixed line for
criminality is that prosecutorial discretion becomes central to the application of the state's
imposition of criminal sanctions. This Article illustrates, by core examples, how elastic the
application of the criminal law can be. It considers remedies that will protect against both
good and bad faith abuse without sacrificing the legitimate and central role of prosecutorial
discretion. In particular the Article argues for a reinvigoration of the rule of lenity and for
the incorporation of the English requirement of dishonesty in theft crimes.
INTRODUCTION
It is a common misconception that there is a line between crim-
inal and innocent conduct that is transparent and fixed.' In part,
much of criminal law is fluid and elastic, free, if strategically ap-
plied, to label conduct as legal or illegal. In some cases, this reflects
crimes that are vaguely defined or imprecise. In other cases, the
prohibited conduct simply includes what is so conventionally ac-
cepted as legal that the criminal label is perceived as inapplicable
until a prosecutor chooses to apply it.
The problem of a fluid rather than fixed line for criminality is
that prosecutorial discretion becomes central to the application of
the state's imposition of criminal sanctions. The recent congres-
sional investigations concerning the potential politicization of
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A., Yale
College; Dipl. Crim., Cambridge University; J.D., Columbia Law School. The author ex-
presses his appreciation for the exceptional research and editing provided by Michael P.
Murtagh, Michael R. Portanova, and Mehriar Sharifi and the outstanding manuscript prepa-
ration by Divina J. Morgan. I would also like to thank Lucia M. Diamond for her insightful
contributions.
1. See generally Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROBS. 401, 417 (1958) (arguing that criminal law serves several complex and interwoven
social purposes).
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United States Attorney's offices put the problem in a darker light.2
If criminal prosecution is politically motivated and existing statuto-
ry crime can be molded to cover behavior that is not clearly treated
or perceived as criminal, the freedom of the political process itself
can be placed in jeopardy. Indeed, "[a]s much as our society ex-
pects prosecutors to be unaffected by politics in their efforts to
seek justice, it is impossible to ignore the fact that they occupy
their positions because the political system put them there."3 This
problem is aggravated by a cottage industry of political consultants
whose effects on behalf of their candidate can be strongly en-
hanced by catching the opposing candidate committing some
criminal wrongdoing.
While prosecutorial bad faith, where defendants are targeted for
political reasons, can easily be condemned if proven, the problem
is even more endemic to the criminal justice system. Even good
faith prosecutions can be inappropriately aggressive in applying
criminal law to conduct generally not criminalized where other
factors motivate zealousness. Indeed, this later assertion, unlike the
politicization of the prosecutorial process, can itself be challenged.
How can it be overzealous to catch the true bad guy and to be crea-
tive and aggressive in one's efforts? Some would argue that it is
here where good balanced prosecutorial discretion can and even
should stretch the criminal law to punish and deter criminality that
would otherwise evade appropriate sanctions.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I will illustrate, by core
examples, how elastic the application of the criminal law can be. In
this Part, I will also explore how this elasticity can be inappropri-
ately applied and demonstrate problems with this elasticity, namely,
that crimes become vaguely defined by unclear private policies and
that the criminal label can potentially be applied in a politically
biased manner. In Part II, I will consider remedies that will prevent
both good and bad faith abuse without sacrificing the legitimate
and central role of prosecutorial discretion. In particular, I will ar-
gue for a reinvigoration of the rule of lenity as a statutory
interpretation canon and for incorporation of the English re-
quirement of dishonesty in theft crimes. As I will argue later, the
American system of justice-and indeed its political freedoms-
depends on ensuring protection from the misuse of the criminal
sanction.
2. See generally Eric Lichtblau, Report Sees 1egal Hiring Practices atJustice Dept., N.Y. TIMES,
June 25, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/25/washington/24cnd-justice.html (report-
ing on the increasingly political hiring practices at the Justice Department).
3. Sandra Caron George, Prosecutorial Discretion: What's Politics Got to Do zith It, 18
GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 751 (2005).
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I. AMBIGUOUS CRIMINALITY
This Part illustrates the ambiguity inherent in many crimes. It is
not an exhaustive survey of criminal law, but it focuses on certain
crimes that can be particularly susceptible to worrisome expansion:
embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, political extortion, brib-
ery, and obstruction of justice. Prosecutions for these crimes can
sometimes offer little in the way of notice to the accused because
they are based on vague definitions of acceptable private conduct,
encompass conduct commonly viewed as legitimate, and pose a
grave danger of being politically motivated.
A. The Ambiguity of Theft
Much public corruption and criminal prosecution for non-
violent crimes focuses on theft, the criminal acquisition of proper-
ty. At their origin, theft crimes were very limited, focusing on
violent (robbery) and non-violent (larceny) taking of property of
another with intent to deprive permanently. Other equivalent theft
crimes have since then brought more elasticity into the definition
of criminal theft.' This ambiguity is particularly poignant since
wealth acquisition from others is praiseworthy in capitalism, creat-
ing pillars of industry and society.' On the other side of the line are
the criminal thieves and worse.
1. Embezzlement: Vaguely, Privately Defined Crimes
Embezzlement, the fraudulent appropriation of property by one
who has been entrusted with it,6 poses significant borderline issues
between the criminal and the non-criminal. The property of an-
other has already been entrusted to the possession of the
potential wrongdoer.' For embezzlement, the possessor must mis-
appropriate the property." This simply requires proof that the
4. George P. Fletcher, The Metamorphosis ofLarceny, 89 HARV. L. REv. 469, 474 (1976).
5. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 479
(2008) ("The borderline between clever commercial skills worthy of praise in a capitalist
society and 'criminal' acquisition is one that any society must carefully consider and de-
fine.")
6. wAYNE R. LAFAVE & AuSTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 729 (2d ed. 1986);
ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAw 354 (3d ed. 1982); see, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 503 (West 2010).
7. See WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAw 952 (4th ed. 2003).
8. See id.
FALL 2010] 3
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authorized possessor has utilized the property for a purpose or
period in time unauthorized by the owner.' In many cases, the
criminality is obvious, as, for example, when funds entrusted to
someone are misused for personal purposes.'o
Nevertheless, embezzlement is fraught with ambiguity and elas-
ticity. Many jurisdictions (but not all) require intent to deprive
permanently and exclude borrowing from criminal embezzle-
ment." Consequently, courts and prosecutors in those jurisdictions
must carefully focus on intent. With respect to authorization, what
constitutes authorized use is measured by non-legislative owner
directive. In the context of employees and corporations, the differ-
ence between legitimate and criminal use can be quite subtle, as
" [i] t is generally more difficult to decide whether misappropriation
occurred than to decide whether property was unlawfully taken.""
When does personal use of a fax machine, paper, telephone, or
computer constitute criminal embezzlement? While technically no
amount is de minimis under the law, at what amount does the cor-
poration cease by its written and unwritten rules to have
authorized or otherwise accepted such personal employee use?
When should the prosecutor declare embezzlement?
These issues are hardly theoretical for modern public officials. A
recent highly publicized case against a county coroner, marred by
numerous outside allegations of improper political motivation
against the United States Attorney, involved limited personal use of
faxes and autopsy space.' 3 In another case, the Los Angeles Sheriff
was convicted of embezzlement in part for excessively providing
transportation to a local politician. 14 A former director of the F.B.I.
was fired for, among other things, using F.B.I. vehicles for personal
9. Id. at 947.
10. Id. at 948 ("Embezzlement statutes sometimes are worded in terms of the wrong-
doer's conversion 'to his own use.'"); Louis Schwartz, Theft, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME
ANDJUSTICE 1537, 1543 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).
11. See, e.g., People v. Talbot, 28 P.2d 1057 (Cal. 1934).
12. Schwartz, supra note 10, at 1544.
13. SeeJason Cato, Ex-Coroner Wecht Not a Criminal, Jurors Say, PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REv.,
Apr. 29, 2008, http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/s_564787.html; Jason Cato,
Remaining Counts Against Ex-Coroner Wecht Are Dropped, PITrSBURGH TRIB.-REV., June 2, 2009,
http://www2.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/specialreports/wecht/trial/s
6 2 7 8
11.htrnl; see also Paul Kiel, Allegedly Political Prosecution Ends in Hung Jury, TPMMUCKRAKER
(Apr. 9, 2008, 2:49 PM), http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2008/04/
alleged-political-prosecution.php.
14. People v. Sperl, 126 Cal. Rptr. 907, 912-13 (Ct. App. 1976)
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travel. He argued that he had not acted improperly and that the
"investigation into his activities was politically motivated." 6
Embezzlement charges are not unique to public officials." At
high corporate levels, there can be a fine line between accepted
corporate activities and unlawful conduct. For example, in success-
ful prosecutions against the CEO and the general counsel of Tyco
Corporation, the use of a mortgage loan program to purchase a
resort residence and the sponsoring of a birthday celebration were
found to be embezzlement."'
This is not to suggest that these or other cases were necessarily
without criminal intent or effect. Nevertheless, these examples il-
lustrate how the somewhat vague consensual conditions of
possession can make the line between crime and private disagree-
ments over proper policy toward property disturbingly elusive.
This line can be even more elusive in periods of economic stress
where activities that might otherwise be viewed as benign and even
well-deserved fringe benefits in times of corporate prosperity can
quickly morph into accusations of criminal embezzlement. For ex-
ample, in People v. Talbot,1 a depression era embezzlement case, a
defendant chief executive officer was found guilty of embezzle-
ment for what he characterized as open advances against future
salary that he argued were "his custom, [and the custom] in other
companies of which he had been an executive."'20 The California
Supreme Court, adopting the opinion of the California District
Court of Appeal, noted that "[t]he evidence also shows that [all
but one of] such withdrawals were not authorized by the board of
directors," but held that "[e]ven if all of the directors of the corpo-
ration knew of such custom, the wrong was not made right," since
company funds should be used only "for company needs."2 ' The
court further suggested that such ratification could potentially
criminally implicate the entire corporate board.22 Yet, as the court
15. See David Johnston, Defiant EB.L Chief Removed from job by the President, N.Y. TIMES,
July 20, 1993, at Al. One of the allegations against the F.B.I. director was that he used
$10,000 of government money to build a fence at his home. Id. at A15.
16. SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 5, at 544 (citing Johnston, supra note 15).
17. Indeed, "the typical embezzler [is] a 26-year old, married Caucasian female having
a high school education, earning less than $10,000 annually and working in an entry level
position for less than one year." Mark Pogrebin et al., Stealing Money: An Assessment of Bank
Embezzlers, 4 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 481, 488-89 (1986).
18. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Ex-Chief and Aide Guilty of Looting Millions at Tyco, N.Y.
TIMES, June 18, 2005, at Al.
19. People v. Talbot, 28 P.2d 1057 (Cal. 1934).
20. Id. at 1061.
21. Id. at 1062.
22. Id.
5FALL 2010]
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conceded, elsewhere corporate advances against future salary were
not necessarily unusual services provided to employees."
Talbot illustrates not only the enormous potential ambiguity that
may exist over the conditions for use of corporate funds and assets,
but it also raises questions about who may set those conditions, and
under what restraints. Lurking within cases like Talbot is the danger
of equating what may arguably be at worst poor business judgment
(at least in hindsight) with criminal theft. The contemporary reces-
sion, if not a depression, has still prompted enormous criticism of
and investigation into extravagant corporate spending and bonus-
es.24 This frenzy of public passion to retaliate can place enormous
pressure on prosecutors to aggressively exploit the ordinary inher-
25
ent ambiguity of embezzlement to police corporate excesses.
Rather than looking to statutory language, prosecutors, courts, and
judges must instead extrapolate the conditions attached to the use
of corporate property and funds from often conflicting and vague
corporate practices and whatever written directives exist.26 This is
particularly difficult when the accused are responsible for defining
these conditions and the legitimacy of even well-established corpo-
27rate policy is questioned.
The danger inherent in this ambiguity is that political populism
will prompt prosecutors retroactively to look for criminal wrong-
doing to help explain economic failures by excessively exploiting
the extraordinarily vague and privately defined boundaries of
23. Id. at 1058-59 ("[T]he practice of making advances of this sort to corporate offic-
ers and employees during this period was common .... The prevalence of this unlawful
practice cannot, of course, justify it.").
24. See Michael A. Fletcher & Zachary A. Goldfarb, Top Aides to Obama Upbraid Wall St.,
WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/
10/18/AR2009101802542.html; see also Ex-Chief of Park Ave. Bank Charged with Bailout Frau,4 N.Y.
TimEs DEALBOOK (March 15, 2010, 4:43PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/15/
ex-bank-president-accused-of-tarp-foaud/?scp=18csq=fraud8cst=cse.
25. Political frenzy places increased pressure on the prosecutor. See Robert H. Jackson,
U.S. Att'y Gen., The Federal Prosecutor, Address at the Second Annual Conference of U.S.
Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940), http://www.roberthjackson.org/the-man/speeches-articles/
speeches/speeches-by-robert-h-jackson/the-federal-prosecutor/.
26. See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 1544 ("That way of handling the transaction may vio-
late standards of professional behavior which explicitly require clients' funds to be
deposited and held in separate accounts; but it would be a harsh rule that transformed every
violation of prophylactic professional regulations into a severely punishable theft. Ethical
codes of the professions generally provide lesser sanctions, such as reprimand or suspension
from practice, and no ethics committee of a professional association should have the power
to redefine crime by changing its rules of ethics. On the other hand, the mere fact that an
act violates professional standards should not immunize professional misbehavior from
criminal sanctions that apply to identical conduct engaged in by nonprofessionals.").
27. See, e.g., Talbot, 28 P.2d at 1058-59.
[VOL. 44.16
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embezzlement. The elasticity inherent in the crime of embezzle-
ment lends itself to this very problem.
2. False Pretense: Policing the Boundaries
of Clever Salesmanship
False pretense is another theft crime whose definition encom-
passes ordinarily acceptable commercial conduct. Most
jurisdictions define the crime as a misrepresentation by the de-
fendant of a present or past material fact, with the intent to
defraud the victim, which results in the victim relying on the mis-
representation when transferring title to property.28  Unlike
embezzlement and larceny, false pretense addresses deception
leading to the transfer of title.29 Historically, under the common
law, a "buyer beware" doctrine essentially permitted misrepresenta-
tion as an acceptable business practice." This has changed, but
great debate still exists over the extension of false pretense to in-
clude "present intent" where the defendant can be criminally liable
if he lies about his future plans.
Traditionally, courts required that the misrepresentation in false
pretense involve a past or present fact, excluding promises from
criminal liability.32 With the support of the Model Penal Code,3 the
majority of courts now characterize the misrepresentation of a pre-
sent intention as a present fact, allowing false promises to be
prosecuted under false pretense. This may be viewed as a positive
change, as the previous exclusion of false promises in commercial
exchanges certainly left unpunished flagrantly false promises that
cheated victims out of their money in exchange for assets and ser-
vices the perpetrator never intended to provide. Nevertheless, the
28. LAFAVE, supra note 7, at 957.
29. Id.
30. See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 6, at 289.
31. Consider how in Chaplin v. United States, 157 F.2d 697, 698-99 (D.C. Cir. 1946), the
court rejects the modem trend extension to include present intent while noting how prob-
lematic it may be to criminalize misrepresentations of present intent:
It is of course true that then, as now, the intention to commit certain crimes was as-
certained by looking backward from the act and finding that the accused intended to
do what he did do. However, where, as here, the act complained of-namely, failure
to repay money or use it as specified at the time of borrowing-is as consonant with
ordinary commercial default as with criminal conduct, the danger of applying this
technique to prove the crime is quite apparent.
32. See id. at 698.
33. SeeLAFAVE, supra note 7, at 960 (discussing MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3(1)).
34. See, e.g., id. at 960-61.
FALL 2010] 7
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expansion has imbedded enormous discretion with the prosecutor
and blurred the boundary between acceptable and criminal con-
duct. The common law originally resisted criminalizing false
promises, reflecting concern over the difficulty in distinguishing a
simple failure to perform or breach of contract from those who
despite their representations had no intention at the start to fulfill
their promises.3' A major concern was "[t]he risk of prosecuting
one who is guilty of nothing more than a failure or inability to pay
his debts" and the corresponding monetary and stigmatic cost of
defending a suit." The contemporary majority approach reflects
confidence that the fact finder can distinguish between a fraudu-
lent promise, which should be criminalized, and the merely
innocent failure to keep a sincere promise.
Interestingly, however, a more subtle and significant issue re-
mains beyond simply proving the defendant's initial intent. As the
Model Penal Code acknowledges, not all intentional misrepresen-
tations should be viewed as criminal because "[a]mong
businessmen, especially in certain trades, there will be a general
understanding that words of promise mean only that the promisor
will perform or submit to civil remedies."08 Accordingly, in order to
accommodate this significant commercial reality, "the promisor
could be convicted of theft only if he clearly intends to do neither,
as in the case where he accepts the benefits of the promise and
then flees the country in order to avoid performance or damages
on his part." 3 9 The Model Penal Code provides that
the actor is to be understood in the sense in which he ex-
pected and desired his hearer to understand him and in the
context of general understanding that surround the particu-
lar dealings involved. It is only where the actor did not believe
what he purposely caused his victim to believe, and where this
35. See Chaplin, 157 F.2d at 699 ("Business affairs would be materially incumbered by
the ever present threat that a debtor might be subjected to criminal penalties if the prosecu-
tor and jury were of the view that at the time of borrowing he was mentally a cheat.").
36. See id.
37. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 7, at 960 n.27 ("Model Penal Code § 223.3(1) provides
that one who purposely creates a false impression as to intention deceives so as to be eligible
for theft by deception if he thereby obtains another's property; but goes on to caution that a
mere failure to perform a promise shall not give rise to an inference that the promisor never intended to
perform his promise.. . . Courts not infrequently emphasize ... the proof of the present inten-
tion not to keep the promise must be very strong so as to ensure against convicting for a
mere breach of contract." (emphasis added)).
38. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3 cmt. at 190 (1980).
39. Id.
8 [VOL. 44:1
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can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, that the actor can
be convicted of theft.40
Consequently, as the Model Penal Code describes false pretense,
the line between exclusively civil and criminal remedies is defined
by commercial context and mutual implicit understandings.
While embezzlement may be defined by specific private under-
standings concerning the proper and improper use of property
entrusted to non-owners (itself, potentially vague, as discussed
above), false pretense differentiates criminal versus legitimate false
promises by a vague understanding of commercially acceptable
conduct. The temptation to pursue criminal sanctions, however,
undoubtedly increases when the alternative civil remedies the
Model Penal Code notes are ineffective due to bankruptcy and
other economic distress. As a result, the prosecutor has enormous
discretion to characterize a simple breach of contract as a fraudu-
lent crime, despite the fact that businesspeople may rationally
decide in advance to breach when it is more efficient." In a popu-
list frenzy of a depressed economy, intentional misrepresentations
43that were once accepted as business norms can easily be labeled
as felonious. There simply, by definition, is no clear line.
Courts following the modern trend toward criminalizing a mis-
representation of state of mind sometimes find that a
misrepresentation of a present state of mind, or of a present abil-
ity to accomplish a future goal,45  is tantamount to a
misrepresentation of an existing fact. While these cases sometimes
reach what appear to be just results,4 6 left unchecked, such a broad
40. Id. For further discussion of the theory of efficient breach of contract, where a
promisor breaches because the cost of paying damages is less than the cost of compliance,
see generally Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947
(1982).
41. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3 cmt. at 189-90.
42. Id.; Macneil, supra note 40.
43. See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 6, at 289.
44. See, e.g., People v. Ashley, 267 P.2d 271 (Cal. 1954). In Ashley, the defendant con-
vinced two older women to transfer their life savings to him based on his representation that
he intended to construct a theater. Instead, he spent the money on himself. The court held
the defendant's intent not to invest the funds as he represented to the victims at the time he
induced the transfer of funds, constituted a present fact and therefore could support a con-
viction for false pretense.
45. See, e.g., State v. Love, 271 S.E.2d 110 (S.C. 1980). In Love, a magistrate accepted
$5500 in exchange for "services" such as taking care of a person's DUI. The magistrate was
not in a position to accomplish this, and the court held that his misrepresentation as to his
ability to execute a future act constituted false pretenses.
46. The clearly wrongful conduct described in Ashley and Love is not the type of bor-
derline conduct that concerns this Article, but these cases nonetheless apply a rule that
9FALL 2010]
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reading of the rules governing false pretenses risk criminalizing
entirely legitimate commercial conduct (breaching an unprofitable
contract and paying damages), and may ask too much of industries
in which puffing is to be expected. What differentiates dishonesty
in fact from shrewd salesmanship in borderline cases?
As discussed above regarding embezzlement, what does and
does not constitute an illegitimate allocation of property depends
on the commercial and professional context of the parties. A simi-
lar rule governs false pretenses: the varying expectations of
information transparency in a particular commercial transaction
seem to patrol the line of criminality. However, those expectations
remain dangerously vague.
Moreover, the expectations of the parties in many transactions
are continuously subject to reinterpretation by the parties them-
selves and by the courts. As it stands, the rule that an individual is
guilty of false pretenses if the wronged party materially relied on a
false statement given by the promisor, even if the wronged party
might have suspected (but not discovered) its falsity, still encom-
passes most cases.4 ' This rule encourages asymmetry in the market,
as it reduces the incentive of less sophisticated parties to ascertain
the truth, instead relying on the more sophisticated party to the
deal to tell them the facts. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit recently
overruled United States v. Brown, a case that had held that a scheme
to defraud under the federal mail fraud statute required that a
person of ordinary prudence would have been deceived by the
fraud. In Brown, real estate investors were convicted of fraud and
conspiracy because they did not tell out-of-state investors that their
houses were more expensive than other houses. 9 The Eleventh
Circuit reversed the convictions in Brown, ruling that the develop-
ers had no duty to disclose price disparities because " [a] 'scheme
to defraud' under the pertinent criminal statutes has not been
proved where a reasonable juror would have to conclude that the
representation is about something which the customer should, and
could, easily confirm-if they wished to do so-from readily availa-
endangers people conducting common business transactions where the defendants are not
so clearly overreaching.
47. LAFAVE, supra note 7, at 962-63; SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 5, at 554 ("The
crime of false pretenses requires a belief, however slight, on the part of the victim that the
misrepresented fact is as the defendant represents it. If the victim knows the defendant is
lying, there can be no reliance.").
48. United States v. Svete, 556 F.3d 1157, 1166-67 (11th Cir. 2009).
49. United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550, 1553-54 (11th Cir. 1996), overruled by Svete,
556 F.3d 1157.
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ble external sources."50 The court in Brown reasoned that "reasona-
ble jurors could not find that a person of ordinary prudence, about
to enter into an agreement to purchase [a home,] would rely on
... the seller's own affirmative representations about the value or
rental income of [the home] . .. ." But if price is a material term,
and if we have moved away from "buyer beware" toward a more
paternalistic commercial regime, then the omission of this fact
could be a misrepresentation, and a charge for fraud can stand.
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit recently overruled Brown, hold-
ing in United States v. Svete that a scheme to defraud does not
require that a person of ordinary prudence be deceived.
The Eleventh Circuit's Svete decision demonstrates that what is
expected to be affirmatively disclosed during a sale is a moving tar-
get depending on the sophistication and knowledge of the other
party to a commercial exchange. Svete removed the requirement
that a person of ordinary prudence be deceived. While this
properly aims to protect the vulnerable, it still leaves unclear what
must actually be disclosed during a commercial transaction. In-
deed, what must be disclosed depends entirely on the one to whom
it is (or is not) disclosed. While the Model Penal Code requires
courts and juries to take account of commercial realities while also
criminalizing false promises, cases like Svete magnify the risk that
an ordinary business transaction could turn into a criminal prose-
cution. When is it legal to exploit a clever bargain, and on the
other hand, when does making a good bargain lead to criminal
charges?
Thus, both embezzlement, discussed above, and false pretenses
illustrate the problems inherent in criminalizing vaguely defined
failures to observe good business practices. The line between ac-
ceptable and criminal conduct remains dangerously thin and ill-
defined, and both crimes become more attractive to prosecutors
during an economic downturn. The Eleventh Circuit's failed Brown
experiment helps to illustrate the narrow line between clever busi-
ness practices and fraudulent misrepresentation; ultimately,
businesspeople have little guidance as they conduct their transac-
tions. In true borderline cases,
50. Id. at 1559 (citing Adolescent Psychiatry, S.C. v. Home Life Ins. Co., 941 F.2d 561,
570 (7th Cir. 1991)).
51. Id.
52. Svete, 556 F.3d at 1166-67.
53. Id.
54. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3 (1985).
11FALL 2010]
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[i]t is not enough to say that if innocent the accused would be
found not guilty. The social stigma attaching to one accused
of a crime as well as the burdens incident to the defense
would, irrespective of the outcome, place a devastating weap-
on in the hands of a disgruntled or disappointed creditor.5
Faced with this very real threat, what are people to do to ensure
that a profitable transaction is not characterized as criminal?
B. Other Ambiguous Crimes
1. Extortion: Negotiation Gone Wrong
Extortion is yet another crime fraught with ambiguity in its ap-
plication, thus posing a great danger of criminalizing conduct
commonly accepted as legitimate. Extortion is generally defined as
(1) the use of a threat (2) in an attempt to obtain (or in some
states actually obtaining) (3) property from another person or
some action from another person. Statutes specify the types of
threats that qualify, including generally accusation of a crime, a
disgrace, or an unlawful injury."7 Blackmail is the colloquial name
for the crime when the threat involves disclosure of a secret.5
While even the term extortion exudes the gravity of the of-
fense, it is remarkably a crime that often envelopes ordinarily
acceptable conduct. Extortion particularly clashes with the Unit-
ed States' pro-settlement culture. While nearly all civil suits settle
before trial, ordinary settlement negotiations may lead to criminal
charges. For example, it is easy to label an attorney or negotiator
an extortionist. In one such case prosecuted early in his career by
Senator Patrick Leahy, an attorney negotiated a divorce settlement
on behalf of an abused wife."5 The attorney threatened to disclose
55. Chaplin v. United States, 157 F.2d 697, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
56. LAFAVE, supra note 7, at 1013-14.
57. LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 6, at 789; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 518 (West 2010);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 703.18 (West 2000); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.05 (Gould 2010).
58. See Mitchell N. Berman, The Evidentiary Theory of Blackmail: Taking Motives Seriously,
65 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 796 (1998) ("I am legally free te [sic] reveal embarrassing infor-
mation about you. Generally speaking, I am also free te [sic] negotiato [sic] payment to
refrain from exercising a legal right. But if I combine the two-offering te [sic] remain
silent for a fee-I am guilty of a felony: blackmail."). See generally Walter Block, Threats,
Blackmail, Extortion and Robbery and Other Bad Things, 35 TULSA L.J. 333 (2000) (concluding
blackmail should not be criminal).
59. State v. Harrington, 260 A.2d 692 (Vt. 1969); see also Murky Legal Turf in Blackmail
Case Against Lawyer Couple, MY SAN ANTONIo NEWS (Sep. 12, 2007, 2:00 AM), http://
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the husband's adultery in divorce proceedings unless the husband
agreed to a reasonable settlement." For his tactics, the attorney was
convicted of extortion and imprisoned, although his sentence was
later commuted.1 Undoubtedly, the case was influenced by the
context.62 The divorce attorney had set up the husband with a
young woman and arranged to have his encounter (interrupted
before sexual consummation) photographed.63 Nevertheless, the
extortion charge would appear to cover routine pre-divorce nego-
tiation. Prominent attorney and Harvard Law School professor
Alan Dershowitz was accused of extortion by opposing counsel for
his negotiations on behalf of Mia Farrow in her divorce battle with
Woody Allen. Dershowitz was alleged to have sought a favorable
divorce settlement in lieu of pressing child abuse allegations
65
against Allen, which were intertwined in the divorce controversy.
Extortion charges touch upon all manner of ordinary negotia-
tions. In California, an attorney was convicted of extortion for
taking $2000 from a client's employee suspected of theft after in-
forming him that "unless he immediately paid defendant $2000 for
the purpose of settling with [the employer], he would be sent to
prison for 7 or 10 years."6 Such cases have prompted reforms, ac-
cepted only by some courts, that claim of right should be a defense
to extortion.67 Thus, the rule-that "[t]he law does not contem-
plate the use of criminal process as a means of collecting a
debt""-has in some places given way to a more nuanced ap-
proach. For example, in United States v. Jackson," the Second Circuit
reinterpreted the federal extortion statute to not include threats to
expose secrets by creditors who are merely attempting to regain
what is justly their due. In Jackson, the court noted that the young
woman, who claimed to be Bill Cosby's out-of-wedlock daughter,
likely requested more than she could argue was her right as a
www.mysanantonio.com/news/MYSA091205_1A-roberts folo_8bc8cflhtml2405.html?show
FullArticle=y.
60. Harrington, 260 A.2d at 695-96.
61. See SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 5, at 579; see also In re Harrington, 367 A.2d 161
(Vt. 1976).
62. See Harrington, 260 A.2d at 699 ("The incriminating evidence which his letter
threatens to expose was wilfully [sic] contrived and procured by a temptress hired for that
purpose.").
63. Id. at 694.
64. See Paula Span, The Brawling Barristers: Abramowitz & Woody v. Dershowitz & Mia,
WASH. PosT, Apr. 17, 1993, at C1.
65. Id.
66. People v. Beggs, 172 P. 152, 153 (Cal. 1918).
67. See LAFAVE, supra note 7, at 1015-16.
68. Beggs, 172 P. at 154.
69. United States v.Jackson, 180 F.3d 55, 70-71 (2d Cir. 1999).
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daughter.o Nevertheless, the court transformed and limited extor-
tion to avoid an overbroad interpretation, holding that a claim of
right can defeat a charge of extortion where the threatened
disclosure would cause payment of the money demanded."
Jackson's interpretation has major implications in the law of extor-
tion by removing some commonly accepted negotiating conduct
from the threat of the criminal sanction. In the above example
regarding the attorney who threatened to charge the employee,
the threatened disclosure-telling the police that the employee
had stolen-could lead directly to reimbursement. Arguably, un-
der the Jackson interpretation, this claim of right would have led
to an acquittal in that case because there was no wrongful intent
and because the threatened disclosure would have led to payment
of the debt."
While Jackson's interpretation limits the reach of extortion,
merely recognizing claim of right as a defense does not eliminate
extortion's broad reach into conduct generally accepted as legiti-
mate by society. Threatening to breach a contract, as entertainers
regularly do, in order to renegotiate a contract to reflect a televi-
sion show's success might constitute threatening an unlawful
injury, which would be criminal extortion under many statutes." As
a threshold matter, the determination of whether the entertainer
enjoys a claim of right (perhaps unjust enrichment) and whether
his threats to breach would in fact encourage repayment (e.g.,
reformation of the contract) if acted upon would be left to the
prosecutor (or a grandjury). To allow such a broad interpretation
is to invite enormous prosecutorial discretion. Consider People v.
Squillante, where the court upheld the extortion conviction of a
union official when the union threatened to picket a store unless it
started using union garbage collectors. The court reasoned that
the union had threatened unlawful injury, picketing, to obtain the
advantage of other contracts.
70. Id. at 71.
71. The court distinguished between threatened disclosures with no nexus to the
claim of right and those with a nexus to the claim of right. The former, such as threats to
expose sexual indiscretions, would still be actionable as extortion because there is no nexus
to the claim of right, while the latter, such as exposing a consumer complaint or past due
debt, might lead directly to the payment of the money due: "In the former category of
threats, the disclosures themselves-not only the threats--have the potential for causing
payment of the money demanded; in the latter category, it is only the threat that has that
potential, and actual disclosure would frustrate the prospect of payment." Id. at 70--71.
72. See id.
73. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 cmt. at 210 (1980); Mark Harris, The $9 Million
Maybe, ENr. WKLY. (Apr. 9, 1993), http://www.ew.com/ew/article/,,306128,00.html.
74. People v. Squillante, 169 N.E.2d 425, 426 (N.Y. 1960).
75. Id.
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While extortion can address what are clearly wrongful threats
and blackmail, its elasticity offers opportunities to prosecutors who
want to target more accepted or benign threats. As Squillante shows,
the extortion crime also offers an opportunity to prosecute poten-
tially unpopular local figures for what many might view as
legitimate bargaining tactics. And despite Jackson, the claim of right
defense is not universally accepted. 6 Thus, people like the attorney
who negotiated for the return of the employer's stolen property
must think carefully before threatening disclosure of the employ-
ee's theft, lest they risk imprisonment. Extortion requires attorneys
and negotiators to carefully consider whether their demands will
later be characterized as extortion. As with the theft crimes previ-
ously discussed, the enormous ambiguity inherent in extortion
threatens to swallow what is ordinarily regarded as legitimate be-
havior.
2. Political Extortion: Separating Donations from Crimes
Political extortion is a particularly dangerous crime for those
concerned with the exploitation of criminal accusation in political
contexts. The common law definition of the crime is a public offi-
cial extorting property under color of official right." As Justice
Scalia discussed in his concurrence in McCormick v. United States,
political extortion under the common law was limited to collecting
fees such as taxes ostensibly for the state and then misappropriat-
ing them.
The Court in McCormick accepted an extension that, in essence,
allows what is commonly considered bribery to be incorporated
into political extortion.0 In McCormick, a defendant state legislator
sought contributions for his campaign from foreign-educated doc-
tors, reminding them that he had supported legislation that
allowed them to practice in his state.80 The defendant received a
contribution from the lobbyist group both before and after he
76. See LAFAVE, supra note 7, at 1014-15.
77. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 279 (1991) (Scalia,J., concurring).
78. See id.
79. Id. at 279 ("Finally, where the United States Code explicitly criminalizes conduct
such as that alleged in the present case, it calls the crime bribery, not extortion-and like all
bribery laws I am aware of (but unlike § 1951 and all other extortion laws I am aware of) it
punishes not only the person receiving the payment but the person making it."). Because of
the often overlapping nature of the two crimes, some of the analysis in the next sub-Part,
discussing problems related to bribery, will also relate to problems with the ambiguity and
politicization of political extortion.
80. Id. at 259-60 (majority opinion).
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spoke in favor of extending the legislation." The trial court, appel-
late court, and Supreme Court struggled with defining the
difference between legitimate campaign contributions and politi-
cal extortion.
The trial court first accepted the extension of extortion to in-
clude the use of one's office to wrongfully gain property.2 The trial
court jury instruction distinguished a voluntary contribution from
political extortion, in that the former was "freely given without ex-
pectation of benefit.""' In distinguishing the two, the district court's
instruction included the following language:
It would not be illegal, in and of itself, for Mr. McCormick to
solicit or accept political contributions from foreign doctors
who would benefit from this legislation.... In order to find
Mr. McCormick guilty of extortion, you must be convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that the payment alleged in a giv-
en count of the indictment was made by or on behalf of the
doctors with the expectation that such payment would influence Mr.
McCormick's official conduct, and with knowledge on the part of Mr
McCormick that they were paid to him with that expectation by virtue
of the office he held. 4
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction, offering nonexclu-
sive "factors" that could indicate whether or not a gift was criminal
or a legitimate campaign contribution:
(1) [W]hether the money was recorded by the payor as a
campaign contribution, (2) whether the money was recorded
and reported by the official as a campaign contribution,
(3) whether the payment was in cash, (4) whether it was de-
livered to the official personally or to his campaign,
(5) whether the official acted in his official capacity at or near
the time of the payment for the benefit of the payor or sup-
ported legislation that would benefit the payor, (6) whether
the official had supported similar legislation before the time
of the payment, and (7) whether the official had directly or
indirectly solicited the payor individually for the payment.8 '
81. Id. at 260.
82. Id. at 264-65.
83. Id. at 265.
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 269 n.7 (quoting United States v. McCormick, 896 F.2d 61, 66 (4th Cir.
1990)).
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The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, noting that the first
four factors "could not possibly by themselves amount to extortion"
and that while the last three factors are "more telling," satisfaction
of all seven factors would not necessarily establish the crime." The
Court held that there must be proof of a specific quid pro quo,
stating that "[w] hether described familiarly as a payoff or with the
Latinate precision of quid pro quo, the prohibited exchange is the
same: a public official may not demand payment as inducement for
the promise to perform (or not to perform) an official act.",8
While the majority treated finding a quid pro quo as a simple is-
sue, Justice Stevens expressed dissatisfaction in his dissent:
[T]he crime of extortion was complete when [McCormick]
accepted the cash pursuant to an understanding that he
would not carry out his earlier threat to withhold official ac-
tion and instead would go forward with his contingent
promise to take favorable action on behalf of the unlicensed
physicians.... [P] roof of a subsequent quid pro quo-his actu-
al support of the legislation-was not necessary for the
Government's case. And conversely, evidence that [McCor-
mick] would have supported the legislation anyway is not a
defense to the already completed crime.
This disputed decision demonstrates how difficult discerning the
line between proper campaign contributions and criminal political
extortion can be. The district court, Fourth Circuit, and Supreme
Court majority and dissent all offered their separate definitions of
political extortion. Political extortion charges can arise in the pro-
cess of seeking contributions, and the desire of contributors to flex
their muscle to support officials who agree with their position of
legislation and other public policy makes very subtle the distinc-
tion between a contribution and a bribe-like political extortion.
The Supreme Court's demand of an explicit agreement helps by
narrowing liability, but it still leaves undefined how specific that
agreement must be.
In Evans v. United States," which also addressed political extor-
tion under the Hobbs Act, the Supreme Court revisited the quid
pro quo requirement articulated in McCormick, holding that "the
Government need only show that a public official has obtained a
86. Id. at 272.
87. Id. at 273 (quoting United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d 531, 537 (5th Cir. 1982)).
88. Id. at 283 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
89. 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
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payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment
was made for official acts."90 In addition, the Court concluded that
"fulfillment of the quid pro quo is not an element of the offense."9'
In his partial concurring opinion in Evans, Justice Kennedy add-
ed more uncertainty to the state of McCormick's explicit quid pro
quo requirement:
The official and the payor need not state the quid pro quo in
express terms, for otherwise the law's effect could be frustrat-
ed by knowing winks and nods. The inducement from the
official is criminal if it is express or if it is implied from his
words and actions, so long as he intends it to be so and the
payor so interprets it.9'
After Evans, the murky waters of McCormick become even less
clear. The majority in McCormick candidly adopted the explicit quid
pro quo requirement to delineate criminal extortion from the
necessary and routine solicitation of campaign contributions. Yet
Evans appears to require only that the public official have
knowledge that a campaign contribution was given for an official
act; the majority makes no mention of an express agreement, and
Justice Kennedy disavows the requirement in his partial concur-
rence. The problem is that under our political system, campaign
contributions are routinely used to reward public officials who cast
legislative votes or make executive decisions favored by the con-
tributor.93 It is the way by which supporters help advance the
reelection and advancement of public officials they admire and
with whom they agree. It is also true that public officials regularly
appoint to non-civil service public positions partisan supporters
who share the official's political ideology and have supported and
worked on behalf of the public official's candidacy.94 Government
appointments, such as fashionable ambassadorships or desirable
commissions, are often rewards to those who helped a political
candidate win.95 They are far less frequently given to those who op-
posed the candidate's election. It would not be an exaggeration to
90. Id. at 268.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 274 (KennedyJ., concurring).
93. See Jonathan D. Salant & Julianna Goldman, Obama Offers Prime Posts to Top Cam-
paign Contributors, BLOOMBERG (May 29, 2009, 12:24 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/ news?pid=washingtonstory&sid=adfv4RHV3Kmk.
94. Id.
95. See Amanda Royal, Obama Administration Picks Wilson Sonsini CEO forJapan Ambassa-
dor Slot, THE RECORDER (May 29, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/articlejsp?id=
1202431065448.
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say that most campaign contributions are given for political acts,
and it is even murkier to surmise when the public official knew it.
This is particularly true in the context of high-profile one-issue
public debates such as health care legislation, abortion, and gun
control, where contributions are commonly solicited and given for
specific political action. Yet acceptance of such campaign contribu-
tions under Evans would appear to satisfy the elements of extortion
under the Hobbs Act even when the official did not even fulfill the
expectations of the campaign donor, provided only that the official
knew for what act the payment was made. At least three circuits6
have attempted to reconcile McCormick and Evans by suggesting
express agreements are required for campaign contributions, but
not other payments. 7 The Supreme Court has also not addressed
whether the McCormick rule of explicit quid pro quo should also be
applied to federal bribery and mail fraud statutes.
This is not to suggest that a political system infused with money
is desirable, but rather that a system where it appears difficult to
delineate the regular acceptance of campaign contributions from
criminal extortion is dreadful. Given this political reality, even the
explicit quid pro quo requirement in McCormick appears danger-
ously subtle. When is the quid pro quo only implicit and not
criminally explicit? The answer is unfortunately not clear. The dif-
ference would not be so significant if the solicitation and
acceptance by government officials of campaign contributions
were not so commonplace, but our political system practically
deems it necessary, appropriate, and indeed laudatory for the right
causes." Just like statutory extortion can encompass routine and
indeed even desirable conduct, political extortion may afford
prosecutors too much discretion to declare and characterize politi-
cal conduct as criminal. In the context of hardball politics, that can
be extremely dangerous.
One could take solace in the notion that whatever the definitional
difficulties the courts have in formulating a criminal line between
criminal quid pro quo and legitimate campaign contributions, Jus-
tice Stewart's famous characterization of pornography, "I know it
when I see it,"99 could also be applied to political extortion. Unfor-
tunately, even the same courts can reach disparate conclusions
96. See United States v. Abbey, 560 F.3d 513, 517-18 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d
134, 142 (2nd Cir. 2007).
97. See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 257 (1992). In Evans itself, however, the
defendant asserted the payments were all campaign contributions.
98. See Salant & Goldman, supra note 93.
99. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart,J., concurring).
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about criminality when faced with the same facts. Consider former
governor Don Siegelman's recent prosecution for bribery and
honest services mail fraud related to his solicitation of a contribu-
tion to his Alabama Education Foundation from Richard Scrushy.100
Following Scrushy's donation of $500,000, Governor Siegelman
appointed him to the Certificate of Need Review Board, a state
agency responsible for healthcare delivery in Alabama.o' The jury
convicted Siegelman of "one count of bribery, one count of con-
spiracy to commit honest services mail fraud, four counts of honest
services mail fraud and one count of obstruction of justice."02
However, the Eleventh Circuit released Siegelman on bond pend-
ing appeal after serving only nine months behind bars.' 3 The court
reasoned that Siegelman had raised "substantial questions" in his
appeal.'0 4 It overruled a previous ruling by a federal district judge
that Siegelman should stay in prison.'05 In United States v. Siegel-
man,0 6 however, the Eleventh Circuit again upheld the Governor's
convictions despite Siegelman's contention that the trial judge's
instruction and the evidence did not satisfy the "explicit quid pro
100. Adam Nossiter, Freed Ex-Governor of Alabama Talks of Abuse of Power, N.Y. TIMES,
March 29, 2008, at Al3.
101. Bob Johnson, Siegelman, Scrushy Lose Bid for Full Court Review, SEATTLE TIMEs (May
15, 2009, 12:05 PM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2009224195_
apussiegelmantrialappeal.html.
102. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former Alabama Governor Don Siegelman,
Former HealthSouth CEO Richard Scrushy Convicted of Bribery, Conspiracy and Fraud
(June 29, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/June/06_crm_409.html.
103. Nossiter, supra note 100, atA13.
104. Id. There were also allegations in the media that the prosecution was selective.
Consider the following description:
On May 8, 2002, Clayton Lamar (Lanny) Young Jr., a lobbyist and landfill developer
described by acquaintances as a hard-drinking "good ole boy," was in an expansive
mood. In the downtown offices of the U.S. Attorney in Montgomery, Ala., Young set-
tled into his chair, personal lawyer at his side, and proceeded to tell a group of
seasoned prosecutors and investigators that he had paid tens of thousands of dollars
in apparently illegal campaign contributions to some of the biggest names in Ala-
bama Republican politics. According to Young, among the recipients of his largesse
were the state's former attorney general Jeff Sessions, now a U.S. Senator, and Wil-
liam PryorJr., Sessions' successor as attorney general and now a federal judge. Young,
whose detailed statements are described in documents obtained by TIME, became a
key witness in a major case in Alabama that brought down a high-profile politician
and landed him in federal prison with an 88-month sentence. As it happened, how-
ever, that official was the top Democrat named by Young in a series of interviews, and
none of the Republicans whose campaigns he fingered were investigated in the case,
let alone prosecuted.
Adam Zagorin, Selective justice in Alabama?, TIME (Oct. 4, 2007), http://www.time.com/
time/nation/article/0,8599,1668220,00.html.
105. Nossiter, supra note 100, atAl3.
106. United States v. Siegelman, 561 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2009).
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quo" requirement established in McCormick. The appellate court
noted that the Supreme Court had not yet considered whether the
requirement that the defendant make an explicit promise to estab-
lish a quid pro quo applied to the federal funds bribery and honest
services mail fraud statutes as well as the Hobbs statute reviewed in
McCormick.'o' Assuming that it did, however, the appellate court ap-
peared to follow Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Evans,'08
concluding that the requirement of an "explicit" agreement did
not require the agreement to be "express."'09 The court concluded
that the explicit agreement may be implied from words and ac-
tions. In the Alabama governor's case, the trial judge instructed the
jury that to convict for bribery, the prosecution must show "'the
Defendant and official agree [d] that the official [would] take spe-
cific action in exchange for the thing of value.","o The appellate
court concluded that the Defendant's request for instructions that
the agreement be express was not required. The appellate court
also recited evidence provided by the Governor's former aide, that
he periodically reminded the Governor of what Scrushy wanted for
his contributions and that the Governor agreed with his own aide
that he did not think that would be a problem."'
Cases like Siegelman raise the question whether the acceptance of
otherwise lawful campaign contributions puts a public official in
jeopardy of criminal prosecution when, even in the absence of any
express agreement, the official acts in a manner consistent with the
desires of his contributor. As observed above, three other federal
circuits,"' unlike Siegelman, have construed McCormick and Evans to
require express quid pro quo to criminalize campaign contribu-
tions. The nuances of the McCormick-Evans quid pro quo issue are
reflected in the highly publicized prosecution of former Illinois
Governor Rodney Blagojevich, accused of a pay-to-play scheme to
sell President Obama's former U.S. Senate seat."'3 The Illinois Gov-
ernor had authority to appoint a replacement. FBI tapes recorded
him saying to an aide, "I've got this thing . . . and it's [expletive]
golden. And I'm just not giving it up for [expletive] nothing.""'
107. Id. at 1225.
108. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 274 (1992) (Kennedy,J., concurring).
109. Siegelman, 561 F.3d at 1226.
110. Id. at 1225.
111. Id. at 1221.
112. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
113. See Monica Davey, Governor Accused in Scheme to Sell Obama's Seat, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
10, 2008, at Al.
114. Id.
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The tapes also indicated Blagojevich had hopes of attaining an
ambassador or cabinet appointment."5 The difficulty in establish-
ing an explicit quid pro quo for value and not mere amorphous
political gain is reflected in the failure of the prosecution to con-
vict on 23 of the 24 charges against Blagojevich."6 Neither
McCormick nor Evans adequately differentiates between criminal
felonies and the routine day-to-day wheeling-and-dealing and
horse-trading necessary to achieve political compromise. Siegelman
underscored the need for clarity in this context:
The bribery, conspiracy and honest services mail fraud convic-
tions in this case are based upon the donation Scrushy gave to
Siegelman's education lottery campaign. As such, they impact
the First Amendment's core values-protection of free politi-
cal speech and the right to support issues of great public
importance. It would be a particularly dangerous legal error
from a civic point of view to instruct ajury that they may con-
vict a defendant for his exercise of either of these
constitutionally protected activities. In a political system that is
based upon raising private contributions for campaigns for
public office and for issue referenda, there is ample oppor-
tunity for that error to be committed.117
With the prolific use of fundraising in politics, the danger of de-
lineating acceptable and criminal conduct remains significant.
3. Bribery: Finding the Line Between Legitimate
and Criminal Conduct.
Bribery, like political extortion, is at the center of political cor-
ruption cases."" As the Supreme Court explained in United States v.
Sun-Diamond Growers, bribery exists when "something of value was
corruptly given, offered, or promised to a public official (as to the
giver) or corruptly demanded, sought, received, accepted, or
agreed to be received or accepted by a public official (as to the re-
115. Id.
116. See Monica Davey & Susan Saulny, Blagojevich, Guilty on 1 of 24 Counts, Faces Retrial,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2010, at Al. Blagojevich was convicted of one count of making a false
statement to the F.B.I. Id. The prosecution has indicated a desire to retry since reportedly all
but one juror favored conviction on at least one other charge. Id.
117. Siegelman,561 F.3d at 1224.
118. See James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: From Com-
mon Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L. REV. 815, 815 (1988) ("When public officials are
prosecuted for corruption, the two most common charges are extortion and bribery.").
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cipient) with intent . . . 'to influence any official act' (giver) or in
return for 'being influenced in the performance of any official act'
(recipient)." "9 Aside from the issue of quid pro quo, bribery itself
is fraught with additional vague contours. In bribery cases, both
the finding of "corrupt" and the requirement that the bribe be
meant to influence official action by the recipient are critical.120
"Corrupt" purpose requires that the gift or other favor be intended
to influence an official act, thus making motive the common sub-
121
ject of litigation. More significant is the uncertainty over what
constitutes an official act.'2 2 Consider State v. Bowling,12 ' where legis-
lators sought payment to recommend issuance of a liquor license.
The court, quoting United States v. Birdsall,1 2 4 observed:
To constitute it official action, it was not necessary that it
should be prescribed by statute; it was sufficient that it was
governed by a lawful requirement of the Department under
whose authority the officer was acting. Nor was it necessary
that the requirement should be prescribed by a written rule
or regulation. It might also be found in an established usage
which constituted the common law of the Department and
fixed the duties of those engaged in its activities.
As indicated by Birdsall, the official action can be broadly con-
strued beyond the specific resume of the employment.2 6
Nevertheless, the court in Bowling found the legislator's action be-
yond the scope of official action, noting the lack of notice provided
by the statute:
[T]he subject statute draws no discernible line separating this
type of concededly noncriminal conduct from that sought to
be punished as a felony in this action. That the legislature has
the power to delineate for punishment the type of conduct
under consideration is not the question before us, but rather
119. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 404 (1998).
120. See Lindgren, supra note 118, at 823-25.
121. Id. For a discussion of various definitions of "corrupt," see Daniel H. Lowenstein,
Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory ofPolitics, 32 UCIA L. REv. 784, 798-806 (1985).
122. See generally Steven J. Mulroy, "Official" Explanation: Defining "Official Capacity"
and "Color of Office" Phrases in Bribery and Extortion Law, 38 U. MEM. L. REv. 587 (2008)
(discussing this issue generally and also under Tennessee law).
123. 427 P.2d 928, 929-30 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967).
124. 233 U.S. 223 (1913).
125. Bowling, 427 P.2d at 935 (citations omitted).
126. 233 U.S. at 230-31.
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whether it had done so at the time of the commission of these
acts. We hold that it had not.27
In reversing the convictions, the court in Bowling cited with ap-
proval various questions raised by the defendant's brief:
Would they violate the statute by accepting remuneration for
a speaking engagement on behalf of a local candidate for of-
fice? How about a legislator-attorney who represents a
property holder on a variance before a local zoning board? Or
a legislator-physician who accepted a free dinner to speak for
or against medicare [sic] ?128
The Bowling defendants' arguments, ultimately persuasive to the
Arizona Court of Appeals, raise the question of when an attorney,
for example, serving on a city zoning board, could accept fees to
represent a client in another context.129 By contrast, in Common-
wealth v. Bellis, a Philadelphia City Council member was convicted
of bribery for accepting $62,000 to represent several corporations
seeking licenses and contracts from the city. 1"0 Although the coun-
cil member represented the corporations in front of city agencies
and did nothing for them in the city council, the court concluded
that the Pennsylvania statute did "not require that the bribe influ-
ence or intend to influence a matter that is within the [public
official's] official duties" but instead requires only a "bribe ... for
showing any favor or disfavor in relation to the affairs or business
of his principal, employer, or master.'
31
This issue of conflicting loyalties has been debated in the con-
text of Hillary Clinton's former law firm, which used to receive
client fees from corporations who inevitably had business in front
of her husband, then the governor of Arkansas. 2 Indeed, with pro-
127. 427 P.2d at 936 (footnote omitted).
128. Id.
129. See Mulroy, supra note 122, at 591 ("As part of their 'day jobs,' these part-time legis-
lators often represent clients as lawyers, financial advisers, lobbyists, or consultants, and
sometimes for clients who may have business of some form before local government....
Such instances raise the related but distinct legal question of how to analyze conduct by
part-time officials who 'wear two hats.' Where a lawyer, lobbyist, or consultant is paid a fee
for legal, lobbying, or consulting work while simultaneously serving as a public official in a
matter directly or indirectly related to such work, is the payment made in the person's offi-
cial or unofficial capacity? The former is criminally punishable, the latter is not. How does
the law determine which hat one is wearing.").
130. 399 A.2d 397 (Pa. 1979).
131. Id. at 399.
132. See, e.g., Jeff Gerth, Clintons Joined S. & L. Operator in an Ozark Real-Estate Venture,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1992, at Al.
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fessional couples, now the norm, the issue becomes even more
prevalent. Even without focusing on couples, almost no major po-
litical figure. can avoid some contexts subject to criticism. For
example, President Obama was given the opportunity to purchase
property near his new home by a friend and fundraiser now facing
criminal charges.'13 Senator McCain has been given support by a
fundraiser who sought and received the constituent service of an
endorsement while seeking a government contract.3 4 In short, the
line is very blurry and leaves politicians vulnerable to bribery
charges. Indeed, the political gains to be had in embroiling a can-
didate or member of the opposite party in a criminal investigation
can risk motivating or pressuring some prosecutors into indicting
or declining to prosecute when they should not,'
Bribery's elasticity is exacerbated by the lack of proof that per-
vades most bribery cases. An attempt to prove that a bribe is not
actually an innocent campaign contribution will often find a paper-
less trail'3" and is also unlikely to include a complaining victim. 3 7 It
is this elusiveness of evidence of bribery that both protects the
guilty and threatens the innocent. The Fifth Circuit noted that "the
133. See, e.g., Peter Slevin, Obamna Says le Regrets Land Deal with Fundraiser, WASH. POST,
Dec. 17, 2006, at A6.
134. SeeJim Rutenberg et al., For McCain, Self-Confidence on Ethics Poses Its On Risk, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2008, at Al.
135. James Fleissner, Comment, lrosecuting Public Officiah Under the Hobls Act: Inducement
as an Elemoent of Extortion Under Color of Official Right, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 1066, 1086-1087
(1985). There is evidence of selective prosecution of one party over another. A study by
Professor Shields of the University of Missouri-St. Louis, about which he later testified before
the House Judiciary Committee, noted that the national "party affiliation of elected officials is
roughly 50 percent Democrat, 41 percent Republican and 9 percent Independent." Algations
of Selective Iosecution: Tiwh Erosion of Pddic Confidence in Our ederal Justice System Before the II.
Comm. on the judiciary, 110th Cong. 224 (2007) (statement of Donald Shields, Professor, Univer-
sity of Missouri-St. Louis) [hereinafter Selective Irosecution], available at http://judiciary.
house.gov/hearings/hear_102307_2.html. While "[t]hese investigation rates mirror the na-
tional percentages of 50 percent Democrat, 41 percent Republican, and 9 percent
Independent-Other," id., Professor Shields explained that "when it comes to investigation
and indictment of local officials by the DOJ, the numbers are staggeringly disproportion-
ate-80 percent Democrats, 14 percent Republicans, 6 percent Independent. That is 5.6
Democrats investigated for each Republican, 5.6-to-1 when the ratio should be 1.2-to-1, and
that is out of 820 investigations . . . ." Id. at 224-25.
136. In the political extortion context, Justice Kennedy, arguing that the quid jno quo
must be explicit but not express, noted that the "law's effect could be frustrated by knowing
winks and nods." Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 274 (1992) (KennedyJ., concurring);
see also Lowenstein, suflna note 121, at 786-87 ("In particular, the bribery laws are supposed
to require a quid pro quo-an explicit exchange of a specific benefit for a specific official
action (or inaction)-a requirement that is evaded easily, and is difficult to prove even when
it has not been evaded. Thus, the difficulty with bribery laws is supposed to be ineffective-
ness rather than uncertainty." (footnote omitted)).
137. See RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 568 (2d ed.
2005).
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process of arranging a payment will often involve a subtle, and
largely unspoken, negotiation period, during which each side en-
sures the intentions of the other."3 If the negotiation is unspoken,
then how does one distinguish a gift from a bribe or a contribution
from a payofP It would certainly be a question for the fact finder,
but there should be a clearer rule to give prosecutors better guid-
ance before they level expensive, potentially career-destroying
allegations, given that
[n]o politician who knows the identity and business interests
of his campaign contributors is ever completely devoid of
knowledge as to the inspiration behind the donation. There
must be more specific knowledge of a definite official act for
which the contributor intends to compensate before an offi-
cial's action crosses the line between guilt and innocence.'3 9
The determination of specific knowledge, and what constitutes
proof when a smoking gun recording or document is lacking, is
left initially to the prosecutor.
Undoubtedly prosecutors require leeway to both dissuade and
prosecute officials for bribery, but if the office pursues cases too
often with questionable motivation and shaky evidence, the public
will eventually grow tired-or worse, will grow accustomed to accu-
sations of corruption-leaving the response to the truly invidious
dangerously anemic.
United States v. Singleton' 0 represents an ironic twist on the dan-
ger of bribery being applied to what is considered legitimate
conduct. In that case, a three-judge panel of the Tenth Circuit held
plea bargain deals in exchange for truthful testimony constituted
criminal bribery on the part of the prosecutor. The en banc panel
reversed, with three judges still dissenting and two recognizing the
bribery statute was implicated by its language, but holding that
Congress never intended that application."' The court's analysis
138. United States v. Pattan, 931 F.2d 1035, 1040 n.9 (5th Cir. 1991).
139. United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
140. 165 F.3d 1297, 1303 (10th Cir. 1999). The determination that the prosecutor's
conduct constituted bribery resulted in an initial reversal of conviction against the defend-
ant. Id.
141. In support of this interpretation, the Tenth Circuit noted the common law history
of the government's power to offer leniency in exchange for testimony:
From the common law, we have drawn a longstanding practice sanctioning the tes-
timony of accomplices against their confederates in exchange for leniency. Indeed,
[nlo practice is more ingrained in our criminal justice system than the practice of the
government calling a witness who is an accessory to the crime for which the defend-
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suggests that there needs to be an interpretive commitment not to
read a criminal statute literally, but rather to limit its meaning to
the core wrong, aiming to avoid absurd results that criminalize ac-
ceptable conduct.
When prosecutors' well-established prosecutorial tactics can ar-
guably be characterized as bribery, one must seriously consider
whether the criminal law's potential reach extends too far. In addi-
tion, one must not forget the effects on the public perception of
government legitimacy-overreaching criminalization damages not
only the charged, but also the public itself.
4. Obstruction ofJustice
Perhaps more than any crime, obstruction of justice invites ex-
pansive, elastic application. A typical federal statute reads as
follows:
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threaten-
ing letter or communication, endeavors to influence,
intimidate, or impede any grand or petitjuror, or officer in or
of any court of the United States, or officer who may be serv-
ing at any examination or other proceeding before any
United States magistrate judge or other committing magis-
trate, in the discharge of his duty, . . . or corruptly or by
threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communica-
tion, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to
influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of
ant is charged and having that witness testify under a plea bargain that promises him
a reduced sentence.
This ingrained practice of granting lenience in exchange for testimony has created
a vested sovereign prerogative in the government. It follows that if the practice can be
traced to the common law, it has acquired stature akin to the special privilege of
kings. However, in an American criminal prosecution, the granting of lenience is an
authority that can only be exercised by the United States through its prosecutor;
therefore, any reading of section 201(c) (2) that would restrict the exercise of this
power is surely a diminution of sovereignty not countenanced in ourjurisprudence.
Moreover, in light of the longstanding practice of leniency for testimony, we must
presume if Congress had intended that section 201(c) (2) overturn this ingrained as-
pect of American legal culture, it would have done so in clear unmistakabIe, and
unarguable language.
Id. at 1301 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). For general discussion of this case, see
generally A. Jack Finklea, Note, Leniency in Exchange for Testimony: Bribry or Effective 1osecu-
tion?, 33 IND. L. REV. 957 (2000).
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justice, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b)
[which imposes a maximum sentence of ten years in prison
except in extreme cases, such as those involving murder or at-
tempted murder] .
Unlike the original common law accessory after the fact, 1 which
broader conspiracy statutes have overwhelmed, 4 4 obstruction of
justice can be broadly construed. Obstruction of justice charges
may be leveled against companies when investigations or lawsuits
are pending. In one case, merely sending an email asking employ-
ees to follow standard procedure in cleaning up files led to a high-
profile criminal prosecution."'
Obstruction of justice can also be used in expansive ways to
target political figures. Most notably, Special Prosecutor Kenneth
Starr argued that President Clinton's denial of an extra-marital
affair to his White House aides constituted an attempt to obstruct
justice since the aides might be called to testify.1'4 Even arguing a
new secret service privilege from disclosure was argued by Starr to
be an obstruction."' In total, President Clinton faced four sepa-
rate charges of obstruction ofjustice."
While guilt depends on mens rea, the fluidity of the obstruction
statute invites creative and expansive prosecutorial interpretation.
Starr's arguments show how the obstruction statute can be applied
even to a good faith legal argument or the ever so common denial
of an embarrassing secret. The broad language of the obstruction
ofjustice statute invites creative prosecutors to bring obstruction of
justice charges against political opponents in cases where other
142. 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (2006).
143. The common law elements of accessory after the fact include: (1) a felony has
been committed; (2) the defendant knows the felon committed the crime; (3) the defend-
ant aids the felon; (4) with the purpose of hindering his or her apprehension by authorities.
See LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 6, § 6.9(a).
144. Compare id., with LAFAVE, supra note 7, at 621 ("In the case of conspiracy, there
must be: (1) an agreement between two or more persons, which constitutes the act; and
(2) an intent thereby to achieve a certain objective which, under the common law defini-
tion, is the doing of either an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means. Many
jurisdictions also require an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, but this is usually
viewed as an evidentiary requirement.").
145. United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Arthur Andersen v.
United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005); Andrew Ross Sorkin, Quattrone May Avoid 3rd 7hal, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 19, 2006, at CI.
146. OFFICE OF THE INDEP. COUNSEL, THE STARR REPORT: THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL'S INVESTIGATION OF THE PRESIDENT, H.R. Doc. No. 105-310 (1998)
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charges might not stick. While there are obvious cases where ob-
struction of justice charges would be appropriate, the broad
language of the statute includes a variety of conduct.'49
Obstruction of justice is yet another crime which threatens to
encompass ordinary conduct in certain cases-following a docu-
ment retention policy, denying an affair, or arguing for a secret
service privilege. Like the other crimes discussed above, merely
being charged can have drastic effects, and because the crime itself
involves destruction of evidence, the danger of stigmatic harm is
great. The following Part discusses ways to prevent the greater
harm of a criminal conviction for obstruction of justice and the
other crimes discussed above.
II. THE CASE FOR LIMITING CRIMINAL EXPANSION
A. Prosecutorial Discretion Is Insufficient to Curb These Problems
In this Article, I have shown the ambiguity inherent in many
crimes, and I have also shown the dangers of selective prosecution
accompanied by the expansion of criminal law to cover behavior
previously not considered criminal. With certain crimes, such as
extortion and the theft crimes, it becomes clear that what may be
considered either well-accepted forms of private behaviore or
vaguely defined breaches of either corporate policy'" or commer-
cial standards1 5 1 may be met with criminal sanctions. These
expansions raise the questions of whether there was ever any notice
that the actions complained of were criminal and whether actions
are appropriately criminalized given the availability of private, civil
remedies. In other examples discussed above, such as political ex-
tortion, bribery, and obstruction of justice, the potential for
political motivation and selective prosecution is ever-present. 5 3
149. Of course, bringing obstruction of justice charges can have a drastic effect on the
accused, be it a company, see Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 697, corporate executive, see Quat-
trone, 441 F.3d at 154, or politician, see STARR REPORT, supra note 146. "The combination of a
social inference of guilt from investigation or indictment and the heightened inferential
basis for guilt where a charge of destruction of evidence is involved creates a circumstance
where the danger of unfounded social stigma is particularly strong." Daniel Shtob, Note,
Corruption of a Term: The Problematic Nature of 18 U.S. C. 1512(c), the New Federal Obstruction of
justice Provision, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1429, 1458-59 (2009). Indeed, "[w] hile selective prosecu-
tion is not unique to obstruction of justice, the inferential nature of many obstruction of
justice accusations invites abuse." Id. at 1455.
150. See supra Part I.B.1-2.
151. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing embezzlement).
152. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing false pretenses).
153. See supra Part I.B.2-4.
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These examples illustrate a risk: prosecutors can stretch either a
statute or a common law definition of a crime to cover behavior
never yet thought illegal or indistinguishable from generally prac-
ticed behavior.
At the center of these issues lies the role of prosecutorial discre-
tion-and its insufficiency in curbing both the expansion of crime
and selective prosecution. 154
The stigmatic harm, while great in itself, is accompanied by fi-
nancial harm in the cost of legal defenses."'5 Despite these
enormous consequences, prosecutors have incredible discretion in
choosing whom to charge and with what crime because "no prose-
cutor can even investigate all of the cases in which he receives
complaints.'""6 This enormous discretion may lead to pressure to
prosecute unpopular groups, as " [i] n times of fear or hysteria polit-
ical, racial, religious, social, and economic groups, often from the
best of motives, cry for the scalps of individuals or groups because
they do not like their views." 5 1 While this temptation should be re-
sisted, there is always danger that prosecutorial discretion may be
exercised in a biased or partisan fashion.
Part of the reason that prosecutorial discretion alone is not
enough to curb the expansion of criminal law is that, as discussed
above, selective prosecution is so difficult to prove.'59 It is difficult,
for example, for the courts to evaluate the propriety of a prosecu-
tor's decision to bring a charge without studying complex issues of
154. SeeJOSEPH F. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 3.01 (4th ed. 2008) ("Once
an individual is charged with a crime-regardless of the outcome-his life will never be the
same. From the moment an arrest is made, a complaint is filed or a target letter is received,
the client will experience fear and anxiety, will incur significant legal expenses and, in many
cases, will encounter public ridicule and scorn. Even if counsel successfully arranges for the
charges to be dismissed at the pre-trial stage or obtains an acquittal at trial, most of the cli-
ent's family, friends, and business associates will be skeptical. Rather, than believing that
your client was a citizen unjustly accused and subsequently vindicated, most will feel that a
smart lawyer 'got him off.'").
155. See sources cited supra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing stigmatic harm
and cost of legal defense generally).
156. Jackson, supra note 25.
157. Id.
158. See Selective Prosecution, supra note 135.
159. For instance, in order to establish an equal protection violation in the charging
decision, a criminal defendant must present clear and convincing evidence. See United
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 470 (1996); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,
364 (1978) ("[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused
committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what
charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion."). This
high standard is in part grounded in the practical difficulties of determining whether a
prosecutor acted unconstitutionally.
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resource allocation.60 Thus, prosecutors have "an enormous
amount of power to decide what the criminal law will really mean
in their jurisdictions,"16 ' but whether they bring charges at all and
what charges they bring is virtually within their unrestricted discre-
tion.12 "While the prosecutor at his best is one of the most
beneficent forces in our society, when he acts from malice or other
base motives, he is one of the worst."1
Of course, broad prosecutorial discretion is not without its sup-
porters. Creative and aggressive use of criminal statutes can be
arguably characterized as praiseworthy. Conduct commonly
thought of as wrongful or immoral will not slip through criminal
loopholes. Society will be protected from conduct worthy of con-
demnation. The innocent will be protected, and the prosecutor
need not wait for the legislator to catch up with the times and draft
a new law to cover something that should be condemned.
Therein lie both the problem and the need for a solution out-
side of mere prosecutorial discretion. "The prosecutor has more
control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in
America,"l 64 yet "there is no outside authority overseeing and
checking the propriety of the executive's investigative decisions,
including decisions not to investigate or prosecute suspected of-
fenders."'62 Thus, prosecutorial discretion alone may not be
enough to curb the influence of politics or viewpoints on criminal
accusations. The examples shown above of criminal law being
stretched to cover commonly acceptable conduct and the risk of
selective prosecution based on political affiliation show the dangers
of an unchecked, overzealous and/or politically motivated prose-
cutor. This Article attempts to advance appropriate solutions to
limit such excessive prosecutions.
160 See, e.g., ALLEN ET AL., supra note 137, at 1050 ("[W]hat, exactly, is the practical ob-
stacle to judicial regulation of prosecutorial charging decisions? One possible answer is that
such regulation would involve the courts in complex resource allocation judgments-that
only the prosecutor knows what mix of cases she has before her, and hence only the prose-
cutor knows what the opportunity cost of prosecuting in any given case is."); see also
LAWLEsS, supra note 154 (discussing the judicial reluctance to utilize or enforce remedies
for prosecutorial misconduct.).
161. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 137, at 1045.
162. Id.
163. Jackson, supra note 25.
164. Id.
165. Diana Viggiano, Aiming the Canons at the General: How Should Traditional Canons of
Legal Ethics Constrain an Attorney General?, 22 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHics 1193, 1194 (2009).
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B. Curbing Aggressive Expansion and Selective Prosecution
This Article does not attempt to provide a mechanism to check
prosecutorial discretion as such. Rather, it proposes solutions that
could help ensure that criminal law is applied faithfully and fairly
despite potential lapses in prosecutorial discretion. Thus, these
solutions would come into play when the law is being aggressively
expanded by the prosecutor's interpretation and/or when there is
a danger of political bias. The solutions, to be discussed below, are
a reinvigoration of the rule of lenity and incorporation of the Eng-
lish requirement of dishonesty in theft crimes. Both of them, either
individually or working together, could reduce these problems.
1. The Rule of Lenity Prevents Overly Aggressive Uses
of Criminal Law and Selective Prosecution
The first recommended solution is a reinvigoration of the rule
of lenity as a statutory interpretation canon. Both the expansive
interpretations of criminal law, discussed above, and the politically
motivated prosecutions flout the lessons of a too often ignored rule
of lenity, a historic common law canon of statutory interpretation.
The rule of lenity has been defined as requiring that "if the puni-
tive statute does not clearly outlaw private conduct," the private
actor cannot be penalized. 6 6
A number of justifications for this rule have been advanced:17
first, fair notice; second, humanitarian considerations, most par-
ticularly in the context of capital punishment; third, the protection
of separation of powers by limiting the judiciary's ability to legislate
crime by expansive interpretation.'6" The rule also ensures that the
legislature, and not the executive acting through its agent-
prosecutor, proscribes and determines the threshold of criminal
behavior.6 Importantly, the rule of lenity is unnecessary if prosecu-
tors do not choose to aggressively expand the criminal law: if
prosecutors carefully exercise discretion and decline to prosecute
where there is little notice-for instance, where a statute does not
clearly proscribe the conduct as criminal-there will be no need
166. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY 852 (3rd ed. 2001). For an excellent discussion of the history of lenity, see
Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language and Lenity, 40 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 57, 58-60 (1998).
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for the courts to even apply the statute, let alone apply the rule of
lenity.
All of the justifications for the rule of lenity counsel strongly in
favor of slowing this aggressive expansion of criminal law. First, the
extensive expansion of crimes certainly undermines the goal of fair
notice. Fair notice is also implicated in the selective prosecution
context, as the heart of a selective prosecution case is an allegation
of disparate treatment by the prosecutor. While it could be argued
that wrongdoers are not necessarily well read in the law and igno-
rance of the law is normally not an excuse anyway, the principle of
notice remains essential. Furthermore, notice limits the discretion
of prosecutors by disallowing unexpected and aggressive exten-
sions of the law. Especially when so many crimes are inextricably
linked with vague notions of unacceptable breaches of private poli-
cies,o notice is best served by the courts declining to extend the
law to cover unexpected, uncertain factual scenarios even where
the prosecutor has chosen to charge the crime.
Use of the rule of lenity would also help to lessen the risk of ar-
bitrary or politically motivated prosecution. Both stare decisis and
principles of separation of powers counsel that liberty and justice
are best served by clarity and regularity; expanding criminality
without legislative direction, or respect to precedent, undermine
this foundational concept of American jurisprudence. Transparen-
cy and fair notice are best served when prosecutors choose only to
prosecute when conduct is well-proscribed in the criminal code,
and consistently prosecuted in the criminal courts. By restricting
prosecutions to these discrete zones of conduct, the margin for
malicious or inappropriately expansive prosecution shrinks.
While the humanitarian justification for lenity was initially con-
ceived to avoid excessive capital punishment,' it seems equally
appropriate as a ground for mitigating the harshness of a criminal
sanction in areas where the law is being expanded. The deprivation
of liberty for a period of years or decades is no light undertaking
and should be avoided unless absolutely necessary. When the law is
expanded, new conduct is criminalized. Defendants, while protect-
ed by the requirement of notice, lose the benefit of time-tested
legal defenses to the new charge and the experience of years of
predictability in what constitutes criminal conduct in that particu-
lar context. Yet they face the prospect of expensive legal defenses
170. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing embezzlement).
171. EsKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 166, at 851-54.
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and stigma as a result of being charged,'7 2 and if convicted they
face a deprivation of liberty.
The expansion of law also implicates separation of powers con-
cerns, as both the executive (prosecutor) and the judiciary should
not create new criminal law. It is said that there exists a dialogue
between the courts and the legislature."' For instance, legislators
sometimes respond directly to judicial decisions they do not like by
passing new laws to reverse judicial pronouncements;'7 4 alternative-
ly, their silence in the face of an administrative or judicial
interpretation can be construed as legislative acquiescence.1' The
same dialogue may occur between the executive and the legisla-
ture-if a statute omits penal sanctions for unforeseen or novel
conduct, the prosecutor's inability to apply criminal sanctions may
be met with legislative action.'7 1 On the other hand, if the prosecu-
172. Consider the recent example of two nurses charged with "misuse of official infor-
mation," a felony under Texas law, after they reported their doctor supervisor for allegedly
unprofessional conduct. See Kevin Sack, Texas Nurse Faces Trial and Possibly 10 Years in Prison
for Reporting a Doctor, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 7, 2010, at A18. The case against another nurse was
already dismissed at the prosecutor's discretion, but
[t]he nurses, who are highly regarded even by the administrator who dismissed them,
said the case had stained their reputations and drained their savings. With felony
charges pending, neither has been able to find work. They said they could feel heads
turn when they walked into local lunch spots like ElJoey's Mexican restaurant.
Id. Clearly, this prosecution has had grievous effects on the nurses despite its likely lack of
ment.
173. See generally ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 166, at 851-54.
174. Perhaps the most famous example of this is the legislature's response to Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), said to be the impetus for the formulation and eventual
ratification of the 11th Amendment. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) ("Chisholm
v. Georgia.. . created such a shock of surprise throughout the country that, at the first meet-
ing of Congress thereafter, the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution was almost
unanimously proposed, and was in due course adopted by the legislatures of the States.").
Congress also directly responded to the Supreme Court's decision in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530
U.S. 914, 932 (2000), in the Partial Birth Abortion Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
175. See, e.g., Cable Ariz. Corp. v. CoxCom, Inc., 261 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2001) (cit-
ing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599 (1983) (congressional silence
acquiesces in administrative interpretation) and Lewis v. United States, 663 F.2d 889, 891
(9th Cir. 1981) (congressional silence affirms judicial interpretation)).
176. For example, Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994), illustrates the dialogue
between Congress, the prosecutor, and the courts discussed above. Congress enacted a crim-
inal statute requiring "willfulness" for a violation of the Money Laundering Act, and the
prosecutor initially interpreted the statute by charging Ratzlaf with a violation of the Money
Laundering Act where there was no evidence that Ratzlaf knew that his actions were unlaw-
ful. The Court, noting the unclear language of the statute and citing the rule of lenity,
interpreted the statute to essentially require specific intent-he had to know that the struc-
turing in which he was engaged was unlawful. Id. at 146. Congress, evidently dissatisfied with
this solution, amended the statute to remove the willfulness requirement for a violation of
the structuring act. See, e.g., United States v. MacPherson, 424 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2005);
United States v. Khalife, 106 F.3d 1300, 1302 n.3 (6th Cir. 1997). In this instance, separation
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tor takes it upon herself to expand the application of the statute,
then the legislature may not be prompted to act, and the law will
progress in a haphazard, undemocratic fashion. Caught within this
extensive expansion are potentially innocent people, and lurking
in the shadows is the difficult to check danger of selective, political-
ly motivated prosecution.
As to its application, I would further argue that the rule of lenity
should be broadly construed to include not only a cautious lan-
guage analysis of the criminal statute, but also recognition of how
the statute has been traditionally applied. An inverse relationship
ought to exist between notice and lenity. The less precedent there
is for a class of prosecutions, the more lenity should be applied.
Past practice like common law helps to define the language and its
meaning in context. To apply old criminal law statutes to new
problems excessively risks undermining the legislative intent and
surprising rather than giving fair notice to the citizens. Indeed,
how does one divine legislative intent in the context of an unfore-
seen development? This is not to argue that criminal law statutes
cannot evolve like the common law to meet new environments and
technology, but rather to argue that these applications should be
conservatively applied to the statute's core mandate.
Currently many states,7 with the support of some scholars,
completely reject the rule of lenity. The Model Penal Code de-
clined to adopt the doctrine and instead dictates that criminal
statutes be "construed according to the fair import of their
terms."'7 9 Furthermore, the Model Penal Code mandated that
"when the language is susceptible of differing constructions it shall
be interpreted to further the general purposes stated in this Sec-
tion and the special purposes of the particular provision
involved."..o Among the "general purposes" listed by the Model Pe-
nal Code are crime prevention, promotion of correction and
rehabilitation, safeguards against arbitrary punishment, and fair
of powers properly functioned, and potential future defendants have notice that the money
laundering act does not require specific intent; that is, they can be prosecuted despite the
fact they did not know they were violating the law. While this solution might have skirted
Congress' intent in the first instance-it appears Congress actually did intend that people
like Ratzlaf be punished despite the Ratzlaf decision-the Court strictly construed the crimi-
nal statute in accordance with the rule of lenity and required Congress to make itself clear
before mandating punishment.
177. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw § 5.04 (5th ed. 2009).
178. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 Sup. CT. REV.
345.
179. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(3) (1985).
180. Id.
35FALL 2010]
36 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
warning." The weakness in the Model Penal Code approach is
that it essentially provides a discretionary balancing approach
that gives courts little specific guidance and makes fair notice
simply one of several factors. This matrix is really a mandate for
case-by-case discretion and does not define the priorities of these
often-contradictory goals. Rather, in essence, it rejects as neces-
sarily prevailing the concerns addressed by the lenity doctrine,
including ad hoc (and potentially more selective and biased)
reformations and expansive interpretations of specific criminal law
statutes. Indeed, in evaluating the sufficiency of evidence support-
ing a guilty verdict on appeal, a reviewing court is supposed to
weigh the evidence most favorably to the government. - This es-
sentially disfavors a defendant when found guilty in the context of
a novel application of a statute. A reinvigoration of the rule of leni-
ty would act as a check at the beginning of this cascading process
to avoid an unjust result.
Unfortunately, even where recognized, the traditional lenity
doctrine has been often narrowly construed and limited. In fact,
current application of the rule follows two methods. The first-that
"courts must decline to impose punishment for actions that are not
'plainly and unmistakably' proscribed"m'-approaches the issue by
asking how the criminal statute actually reads. This may be invoked
in order to overturn a conviction where the statute did not clearly
prohibit the conduct.8 4 An alternative interpretation limits applica-
tion of lenity to where there is "a 'grievous ambiguity or
uncertainty' in the statute.',8a While not rejecting lenity as some
courts and the Model Penal Code do, this approach, by definition,
tolerates less than grievous ambiguity and fails to require that the
court determine the statute's core mandate and plain and unmis-
takable proscription. Since it is not uncommon to find ambiguity
in statutory language, it is understandable that many courts may be
hesitant to open a perceived floodgate to demands of lenity except
when faced with a nearly incomprehensible statutory mandate.
The image of criminal defendants parsing statutory phrases to
181. Id. § 1.02(2).
182. See, e.g., Peter F. Vaira & James A. Backstrom, Criminal Appeals, in 2 CRIMINAL DE-
FENSE nCHNIQUES 48-23 (Elizabeth A. Wolf ed., 2010) (citing United States v. DeLira-
Villareal, 102 Fed. Appx. 406 (5th Cir. 2004), and United States v. Suggs, 374 .3d 508 (7th
Cir. 2004)).
183. Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112-13 (1979).
184. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 148 (1994) (citing the rule of lenity and not-
ing that "were we to find § 5322(a)'s 'willfulness' requirement ambiguous as applied to
§ 5324, we would resolve any doubt in favor of the defendant").
185. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 n.7 (1994) (citing Chapman v. United
States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991)).
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manufacture loopholes to escape punishment has undoubtedly
fanned this increased hesitancy to tolerate a consideration of leni-
ty. Yet there is a reason the lenity doctrine evolved, and ironically,
in its decline, its mandate has never been more needed.
United States v. Thompson represents a desirable and robust ap-
plication of lenity, but it is not at all clear how many other courts
would have applied it under similar facts. Defendant Georgia
Thompson was a section chief of the Wisconsin Bureau of Pro-
curement. Wisconsin selected Adelman Travel Group as its travel
agent for forty percent of its annual $75 million travel budget. As
the Seventh Circuit opinion by Chief Judge Easterbrook described
it, "Thompson steered the contract to Adelman Travel, the low
bidder, even though other members of the selection group rated
its rivals more highly."8 7 According to the appellate court, "[t]he
prosecution's theory was that any politically motivated departure
from state administrative rules is a federal crime, when either the
mails or federal funds are involved."""8 The prosecution also argued
that Thompson's $1000 raise in her annual salary was related to the
contract since the principal owners of Adelman were political sup-
porters of the Wisconsin governor. On appeal, Thompson did not
dispute the latter contention, and the appellate court consequently
assumed this link was established. Thompson was convicted under
18 U.S.C. § 666, which punishes a state agent who both works for
any entity receiving more than $10,000 from the federal govern-
ment and "embezzles, steals, obtains by fraud or otherwise without
authority knowingly converts to the use of any person other than
the rightful owner or intentionally misapplies property"8 valued at
more than $5000 and under the custody or control of the agency.
Thompson's conviction received intense publicity within the state,
and she became a poster child of government corruption for the
opposing political party.'88 The appellate court acknowledged that
"misapplies" could be read broadly to mean "any disbursement
that would not have occurred had all state laws been enforced
without any political considerations.""' Alternatively, the opinion
noted it could be construed "narrowly, so that it means a disburse-
ment in exchange for services not rendered (as with ghost
workers), or to suppliers that would not have received any contract
186. 484 E3d 877 (7th Cir. 2007).
187. Id. at 878.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 880 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2006)).
190. Bill Leuders, Biskupic Tried to 'Squeeze' Georgia Thompson, THE DAILY PAGE (May 17,
2007), http://www.thedailypage.com/isthmus/article.php?article=7081.
191. Thompson, 484 F.3d at881.
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but for bribes, or for services that were overpriced . . . or for shod-
dy goods at the price prevailing for high quality goods"-none of
which the court found satisfied in this case.'9 Utilizing the princi-
ple of lenity, the court adopted the narrow construction and
reversed the conviction after ordering Thompson's immediate re-
lease from prison following oral argument. The court reasoned:
A violation of regulations and perhaps of some statutes has
occurred, but is the error a crime? As we read § 666, the an-
swer is no unless the public employee is on the take or the
applicant is a relative (for indirect benefits are another form
of payoff). An error-even a deliberate one, in which the em-
ployee winks at the rules in order to help out someone he be-
believes deserving but barely over the eligibility threshold-is
a civil rather than a criminal transgression. Likewise the sin is
civil (if it is any wrong at all) when a public employee manipu-
lates the rules, as Thompson did, to save the state money or
favor a home-state producer that supports elected officials. 9 3
The court, again invoking lenity, reversed Thompson's convic-
tion under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, which prohibits "any scheme or
artifice to defraud" employing United States mail and, in this in-
stance, depriving Wisconsin of her "honest services."1 9 4 Concerned
that the prosecutorial approach would convert violation of state
rules into federal crimes, the court noted it had construed the lan-
guage of the statute to mean "misuse of office" for "private gain."'99
The court noted that "it would stretch the ordinary understanding
of language, however, to call a public employee's regular compen-
sation, approved through above-board channels, a kind of 'private
gain.'""9 6 Instead, the court noted that "the Rule of Lenity counsels
us not to read criminal statutes for everything they can be worth.
The history of honest services prosecutions is one in which the
'private gain' comes from third parties who suborn the employee
with side payments, often derived via kickbacks skimmed from a
public contract."'
While in no way explicit, the Thompson decision is suggestive of a
more expansive role for lenity doctrine. I would urge a third ap-
proach in which the lenity doctrine mandates courts to discern the
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 882 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006)).
195. Id. at 883.
196. Id. at 884.
197. Id.
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core contour and boundaries of a criminal law statute as defined by
(1) language; (2) legislative purpose; and (3) past precedents and
applications of the statute. The lenity doctrine should not be
viewed as an obsolete historical anachronism nor restricted to
grievously ambiguous language, but should instead allow courts to
engage the other two branches of government to better insure that
a prosecution is with notice, fairly applied, and consistent with leg-
islative intent. As noted above, lenity has traditionally involved an
interpretive dialogue where legislatures can correct judicial con-
structions that narrow the breadth of the criminal law more than
they desired.'" Yet just as Thompson reviewed past prosecutorial ap-
plications and also focused on insuring a sensible line between
criminal and non-criminal transgressions, this third approach re-
views the executive branch's prosecutorial discretion to insure
against isolated, aberrational extensions in criminalization beyond
mere linguistic interpretation. Ultimately, the legislature can over-
rule the court's lenity with new clarifying legislations thereby
providing notice and consistency, but in the interim, there is more
protection from misapplication of prosecutorial discretion, which
otherwise has little to limit it.
Such a rule of lenity represents a balanced approach to prevent
the overly aggressive expansion of criminal law into commonly ac-
ceptable conduct and acts as an important check to prevent
convictions when prosecutor's application of a statute goes too far.
It may also reduce the risk of selective prosecution in the context
of campaign donations.
2. Incorporation of the English Doctrine of Dishonesty
Another doctrine that protects individuals from overzealous ap-
plication of the criminal law is the English doctrine of dishonesty.
If either legislatures in the United States or the drafters of the
Model Penal Code incorporated a dishonesty requirement in any
of the crimes discussed above, some of the problems associated
with the expansion of criminal law into commonly acceptable con-
duct would be alleviated. Thus, this Article does not suggest that
courts interpret otherwise unambiguous statutes as requiring a
finding of dishonesty, but rather suggests that both Congress and
state legislatures may choose to confront the problems of expand-
ing criminality and selective prosecution by following the example
of such an influential common lawjurisdiction.
198. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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Under English law, the dishonesty requirement goes well beyond
claim of right as a defense since it actually adds to the mens rea
requirement in theft crimes.Iss Thus, one cannot be convicted of
theft unless the court finds the defendant was dishonest.2O Dishon-
esty is not specifically defined in the English Theft Act of 1968, but
section 2(1) of the Act provides nonexhaustive examples of what is
not dishonest.20' The first example is the English analogue of the
United States claim of right defense: "where D believes that he has
the legal right to deprive V of it."202 The second example is where
"D believes that V would have consented if V had known of the cir-
cumstances.,22 The third occurs "where D believes that the owner
of the property cannot be discovered by taking reasonable steps."204
Dishonesty is a question for the jury,200 and courts have developed
an approach to ascertain whether dishonesty is present in cases not
governed by the section 2(1) exclusions:
In determining whether the prosecution has proved that the
defendant was acting dishonestly, a jury [or magistrates] must
first of all decide whether according to the ordinary standards
of reasonable and honest people what was done was dishon-
est. If it was not dishonest by those standards, that is the end
of the matter and the prosecution fails. If it was dishonest by
those standards, then the jury [or magistrates] must consider
199. ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 336 (1991). This Article is
mainly concerned with dishonesty as an essential element of theft crimes. The English Theft
Acts of 1968 and 1978, as well as the Theft (Amendment) of 1996, require dishonesty as an
essential element of theft crimes. See, e.g., Theft Act, 1968, c. 60, § I (Eng.); Theft Act, 1978,
c. 31, § 1 (Eng.); Theft (Amendment) Act, 1996, c. 62, § 1 (Eng.). The Fraud Act 2006 also
requires dishonesty as an element of fraud. See Fraud Act, 2006, c. 35, § 2(1) (Eng.). Alt-
hough outside the scope of this paper, the requirement of honest belief also arises in the
context of defenses to crimes. This is yet another example of English law refusing to convict
people who were acting honestly. For discussion of this aspect of English law, see Kyron
Huigens, The Continuity ofJustification Defenses, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 627, 647 (2009) (discuss-
ing honest belief defenses in English law); Kenneth W. Simons, Self-Defense: Reasonable Beliefs
or Reasonable Self-Control?, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REv. 51, 52 n.2 (2008) ("English law does not
require a 'reasonable' belief in the relevant facts in order to grant a full defense; an honest
belief suffices.").
200. See Theft Act, 1968, c. 60, § 2(1) (Eng.).
201. ASHWORTH, supra note 199.
202. Id.; see Theft Act, 1968, c. 60, § 2(1) (a) (Eng.); RICHARD CARD, CRIMINAL LAW 322
(15th ed. 2001) ("Section 2(1) (a) makes a claim of right (ie [sic] a belief in a legal right to
deprive) a defense to theft, which means that a mistake of law may excuse . . . .").
203. ASHWORTH, supra note 199; see Theft Act, 1968, c. 60, § 2(1)(b) (Eng.).
204. ASHWORTH, supra note 199; see Theft Act, 1968, c. 60, § 2(1) (C) (Eng.).
205. CARD, supra note 202, at 323.
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whether the defendant himself must have realized that what
he was doing was by those standards dishonest.206
This flexible, two-stage process helps to ensure that both the
voice of the community and the individual defendant are heard in
the determination of dishonesty. Importantly, one's honest belief-
whether or not it accords with the beliefs of the community, and
no matter how unreasonable2 o_-can ensure that one is not con-
victed. Of course, the reasonableness of the belief may be relevant
to its genuineness,20 s thus helping to prevent defendants from
flouting legislative intent by falsely claiming honest beliefs.
The dishonesty element may help deter prosecutors from ex-
panding the law to situations not normally covered by the law, thus
serving the same purposes of the rule of lenity as an interpretative
canon. Dishonesty is not always easily found, and requiring dis-
honesty may deter prosecutors in cases where proof is lacking or
where the law has not traditionally criminalized that conduct. Con-
sider Professor Ashworth's description: "Dishonesty may be easily
recognized in some situations, but it is far more difficult in situa-
tions with which a jury or magistrate are unfamiliar-such as
alleged business fraud or financial misdealing. Moreover, much
depends on who is responsible for characterizing conduct as dis-
honest.,
20
Part I.A. of this Article particularly focused on embezzlement
and false pretenses, theft crimes in the United States, showing how
expansively they may be applied. Incorporating a dishonesty re-
quirement into theft crimes in the United States, as the English
have done, may help avoid the problems resulting from this over-
expansion. For instance, in Talbot, the defendants arguably did not
know that their acts were illegal and argued that they were widely
accepted in the company.210 Applying the English dishonesty re-
quirement, this belief, if true, could prevent conviction. Further,
under the two-part test, if the behavior (like in Talbot) is some-
thing that is commonly done in business, it is possible that the
206. R. v. Ghosh, [1982] 1 Q.B. 1053 [1064] (Eng.).
207. See MICHAEL JEFFERSON, CRIMINAL LAw 414 (5th ed. 2001) ("The accused does
not, for instance, need to have reasonable grounds for his belief that the owner would have
consented, had he known of the circumstances."); JC SMITH & BRIAN HOGAN, CRIMINAL
LAW (6th ed. 1988).
208. CARD, supra note 202, at 322.
209. ASHWORTH, supra note 199, at 338.
210. People v. Talbot, 28 P.2d 1057, 1057 (Cal. 1934) ("Certain evidence tended to show
that defendants were not conscious that their acts amounted to embezzlement even if they
did constitute bad business practice.").
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jury, applying the community standards approach, would not find
it dishonest at all, thus also avoiding a conviction.
Additionally, if a dishonesty requirement were incorporated into
theft laws in the United States, the lack of dishonesty would pre-
vent false pretenses convictions of businesspeople for choosing to
breach a contract in situations where it is more cost-effective to pay
damages: this commonly accepted business strategy is something
that, at minimum, the businessperson could establish as a legal
right under contract law. As the dishonesty requirement also en-
212compasses claim of right defenses, cases where somebody with a
good faith claim to property threatens to disclose the debt in order
to obtain payment would also be exonerated from extortion charg-
es if the dishonesty requirement applied to a crime like
extortion.1 It is hard to argue one acted dishonestly when one
merely sought to recover what was one's due, as was at least argua-
bly the case in Beggs and Squillante. Because the dishonesty
requirement ensures that ordinarily acceptable conduct is not swal-
lowed up by the criminal law, both legislatures and drafters of the
Model Penal Code may consider incorporating such a requirement
into our criminal law.
Finally, it is important to remember it is not necessary to adopt
the English dishonesty requirement wholesale. Rather, we can
learn from the English experience and craft a rule that is respon-
sive to the criticisms leveled against the English rule. While the
English dishonesty requirement may be praised for its ability to
include the ordinary sensibilities of the people in its dishonesty
determination, it has been criticized for not providing predictive
guidance to potential criminals-what is dishonest is truly a case-
by-case inquiry, dependent on the jury, the defendant, the location,
and the crime.1 A dishonesty requirement in the United States
could take the form of a specific definition, enacted by legislators
211. See CARD, supra note 202, at 324-25 (quoting R. v. Ghosh, [1982] 1 Q.B. 1053
(Eng.)).
212. See ASHWORTH, supra note 199, at 336.
213. The crime of blackmail in English law requires an "unwarranted demand." SeeJEF-
FERSON, supra note 207, at 414 ("In blackmail the equivalent of dishonesty is an unwarranted
demand."). The same "honest belief" standard applies to blackmail crimes under English
law. Id. at 416 ("With regard to blackmail the Criminal Law Revision Committee did not
want a test that the accused's belief had to be reasonable because such could be out of line
with the rest of the 1968 Act.").
214. ASHWORTH, supra note 199, at 338; CARD, supra note 202, at 325 ("The approach
laid down in Ghosh is liable to create an additional ground for contested trials, to complicate
the judge's direction, and to lead to arbitrary and inconsistent verdicts by different juries or
benches of magistrates as to what is dishonest."). Additionally, Professor Card argues that
the dishonesty requirement as currently constituted may violate the European Convention
on Human Rights because of the lack of standards. Id. at 325.
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and to be interpreted by the courts, as opposed to a potentially
vague jury question with uncertain standards, thus providing more
guidance and alleviating the concerns that the English rule has
generated.
Adding a dishonesty requirement is not a panacea, but it can
work to prevent overcriminalization of ordinarily acceptable con-
duct.
3. Ensuring Proper Application of Criminal Law
My suggested solutions to the problems outlined above, stricter
application of the rule of lenity and a potential incorporation of
the English dishonesty requirement, are not mutually exclusive.
While either of the doctrines in isolation can help to address the
problems outlined in Part I, the two doctrines can work in con-
junction. For instance, greater lenity may lead legislatures to enact
clearer laws instead of prosecutors haphazardly expanding crimi-
nal law to cover new situations. These new enactments will provide
the notice that the rule of lenity strives to protect. Once potential
criminals have notice, what were once honest beliefs of lawfulness
will be negated by an increased clarity and knowledge of the law.
Clear legislative pronouncements, as opposed to haphazard expan-
sions by prosecutors and courts, will help to ensure consistent and
fair prosecutions.
Even if a legislature chooses to enact a crime requiring dishon-
esty as an element, lenity is still important. The courts must ensure
that, if the statute is ambiguous, the criminal sanction is applied
only to conduct that was plainly intended to be within the reach of
the statute. Thus, in defining dishonesty for the jury and in review-
ing convictions of crimes where dishonesty was an element, judges
must still apply the rule of lenity to ensure that ordinarily accepta-
ble conduct does not become confused with dishonest conduct
through excessively aggressive application of the criminal law.
Perhaps most importantly, these doctrines will help avoid the
two main problems regarding the expansion of criminal law: its
vague boundaries that spill over into ordinarily acceptable conduct
and its potential for politicization. A reinvigoration of the rule of
lenity would provide greater notice to defendants and motivate
legislatures to improve clarity in the law. An honest belief in legali-
ty, on the other hand, could protect those prosecuted for
traversing the vague boundaries of acceptable conduct if the legis-
latures choose to incorporate the dishonesty requirement. Both of
the doctrines may be employed to minimize the risk of politicized
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prosecution and provide important checks where appropriate
prosecutorial discretion may be lacking.
CONCLUSION
As shown above, criminal law is filled with ambiguities. Statutes
are imperfectly drafted, and in many cases, criminal law is defined
based on vague, privately defined notions of unacceptable con-
duct. As such, criminal law starts to cover behavior commonly
considered acceptable. There is also a great danger of politiciza-
tion and bias in criminal law prosecution.
These dangers are too great not to attempt to limit or define the
criminal law's application in a principled way. The rule of lenity
and the dishonesty requirement offer a broad approach to ensure
that criminal law does not evolve into either an arbitrary political
tool or a set of random extensions of illegality with little notice to
the accused and little input from the legislature. Prosecutorial dis-
cretion may accomplish these goals without resort to the rule of
lenity or dishonesty requirement; but when prosecutorial discre-
tion fails, the courts should aggressively utilize these principles to
insure a neutral, principled use of criminal law.
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